Certificate Management Security Standard

A technical standard for implementing certificate management controls across discovery, PKI trust architecture, issuance, renewal, revocation, key protection, monitoring, and assurance.

How to Use This Standard

The policy sets direction; this standard makes it implementable. It gives architects, platform teams, security operations, and service owners a common set of technical expectations for certificate lifecycle control.

Use it as a baseline and adapt the exact thresholds to your risk profile, PKI design, cloud platforms, and regulatory obligations.

1. Scope and Alignment

This standard applies to systems, applications, platforms, devices, and services that issue, consume, store, or rely on digital certificates. It supports secure design principles including threat modelling, defence in depth, least privilege, secure defaults, and auditable lifecycle control.

2. Discovery and Inventory

The organisation must maintain automated certificate discovery across internal, external, cloud, and hybrid environments. Discovery should cover public-facing TLS, internal TLS, load balancers, gateways, service meshes, cloud certificate services, endpoint/device authentication, code signing, and S/MIME where in scope.

Inventory fieldPurpose
SHA-256 fingerprint and issuing CAIdentifies the certificate and trust chain.
Subject, SANs, asset, service, and domainConnects the certificate to the thing it protects.
Business owner, technical owner, and environmentMakes renewal and incident response accountable.
Expiry date, renewal method, and key protectionSupports lifecycle automation and risk assessment.

3. Trust Architecture

4. Cryptographic Requirements

Control areaRequirement
AlgorithmsRSA 3072 bits or stronger; ECDSA secp384r1 or stronger; EdDSA where approved and supported.
HashingSHA-256 minimum for constrained compatibility; SHA-384 or stronger for high-assurance services; SHA-1 prohibited for new issuance.
TLSTLS 1.2 minimum, TLS 1.3 preferred, deprecated protocols disabled, weak cipher suites disabled.
Public servicesOCSP stapling should be enabled where supported and certificate transparency monitored for public domains.

5. Issuance, Renewal, and Revocation

Certificate issuance must follow approved workflows. SAN entries must be validated against approved domains, services, or inventory records. High-risk certificate types, including wildcard, code signing, and privileged service certificates, should require recorded approval.

Standard certificates must be renewed at least 30 days before expiry. Confirmed key compromise should trigger revocation within one hour where technically possible. OCSP and CRL services must be monitored for availability and correctness.

6. Private Key Protection

7. Monitoring and Assurance

Monitoring must identify certificates expiring within 90, 60, and 30 days; expired certificates; unknown certificates; weak algorithms; invalid chains; unexpected issuing CAs; CT log matches; and OCSP or CRL failures.

Assurance activities should include quarterly inventory reviews for critical services, quarterly TLS configuration reviews for public-facing services, annual certificate profile review, annual trust architecture review, and incident review after certificate-related events.

8. Metrics

MetricWhy it matters
Expired certificate countShows direct outage and process failure risk.
Certificates without ownersHighlights weak accountability.
Weak algorithm countTracks cryptographic debt.
Renewal failure rateShows automation and operational reliability.
Mean time to revokeMeasures incident containment capability.

9. Governance

Exceptions must be documented, risk assessed, approved, time-bound, and reviewed before expiry. This standard should be reviewed annually or after significant cryptographic standard updates.